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NATURAL RIGHTS AND TWO CONCEPTIONS OF PROMISING
PETER VALLENTYNE
INTRODUCTION
Does promising to perform some act generate a moral duty to the
promisee to perform the promised act? One possibility is that the moral
force of promising is limited to what is morally desirable (as opposed to
required). Prior to the promise, there was, we may suppose, nothing mor-
ally problematic about my failing to meet you at the theater. Once I prom-
ise to meet you there, however, I would not be acting virtuously if I were
not to do so. While this is surely correct, it also seems grossly inadequate
as an account of the moral force of promising. Breaking a promise, most of
us think, is typically wrong and not merely non-virtuous.
Another possibility is that promising generates an impersonal duty on
the part of the promisor to keep her promise. The duty is impersonal in the
sense that it is owed to no one. It is wrong to break a promise, but no one
has a right to have another keep her promise. This comes much closer to
capturing the common sense moral force of promises, but it still seems
inadequate. When, under normal circumstances, I fail to show up at the
theater after promising you to do so, I wrong you. It is not-or at least not
merely-an impersonal wrong. I owe you an apology and compensation.
In what follows, I shall examine the question of whether promising
generates a duty to the promisee to perform the promised act. Throughout, I
shall understand permissibility, obligation, duties, rights, etc., in their pro
tanto (all else being equal) sense. I shall thus be concerned with the ques-
tion of whether there is at least a pro tanto duty owed to the promisee to
keep promises. More specifically, I shall focus on the question of whether
there is a (pro tanto) natural moral right to have promises made to one
kept. I shall thus not be concerned with social practice (institutional) ac-
counts of the obligation to keep promises (according to which there is such
an obligation when one participates in the right way in certain social prac-
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tices),' nor with instrumental accounts (e.g., rule contractarian2 or rule
consequentialist accounts 3).
I shall distinguish two broad conceptions of promising-normativized
and non-normativized-and explore their very different implications con-
cerning the status of the requirement to keep one's promises.
I. THE NORMATIVIZED CONCEPTION OF PROMISING
On the non-normativized conception, which I will explore more fully
in the next section, the nature of promising does not conceptually entail any
connection with the obligation to keep promises. A promise might be un-
derstood, for example, as an assertion that one will do something, along
with a special assurance that one will do so, and an invitation to rely on that
assurance. It may, as a matter of fact, be wrong to break promises so under-
stood, but such wrongness is not built into the concept of promising on this
conception. Promising on this view is like killing, which is also a non-
normativized concept. Even if one believes that killing is always wrong,
this is not part of the concept of killing.
On the normativized conception of promising, on the other hand, the
wrongness of breaking a promise is part of the concept of promising in
roughly the same way that the wrongness of murder is part of the concept
of murder understood as wrongful intentional killing. More specifically, a
promise is made, on the normativized conception, when an agent validly
offers to undertake an obligation to the promisee to perform some act (i.e.,
give up a liberty-right in relation to her) and the promisee validly accepts
the offer. The following are sample statements of normativized concep-
tions:
I take it that promising is, by definition, an act of placing oneself under
an obligation. 4
According to the second [the obligation conception of a promise], prom-
ises are expressions of intentions to undertake obligations.... To prom-
1. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-50 (1971); John R. Searle, How to Derive
"Ought "from "Is, " 73 PHIL. REV. 43 (1964).
2. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note I at 27-33; Searle, supra note 1; DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT (1986).
3. See, e.g., BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD: A RULE-CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORY
OF MORALITY 122-23, 131-32 (2000).
4. Searle, supra note 1, at 45.
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ise is, on this conception, to communicate an intention to undertake by
the very act of communication an obligation to perform a certain action.5
Normative-Power View: Promising is the exercise of the power to effect
a normative requirement that one carry out a course of conduct by com-
municating one's intention to undertake, by that very act of communica-
tion, an obligation so to act.6
The Word-Giving Thesis: If Y gives X his or her word that a certain
proposition is true [e.g., promises that she will do something], then X
thereby acquires a claim against Y to its being true. ... The Assertion
Thesis: Y gives X his or her word that a proposition is true if and only if
Y asserts the proposition to X, and (i) in so doing, Y is inviting X to rely
on its truth, and (ii) X receives and accepts the invitation (there is up-
take). ... There is nothing deeper that either needs to be or can be said
about how word-givings generally and promisings in particular generate
claims. Their moral force lies in their generating claims; and the fact that
they do generate claims is explained by the fact that issuing an invitation
is offering to bind oneself, so that when the invitation is accepted, the of-
fer is accepted, and one therefore is bound.7
The normativized conception of promising is a family of views. One
dimension of variation concerns the normative perspective from which the
obligation applies. The two main possibilities of interest here are morality
and the law. The moralized version holds that promising is validly offering
to undertake a moral obligation to the promisee to perform some act, which
the promisee validly accepts. The legalized version holds that promising is
validly offering to undertake a legal obligation, which is validly accepted
5. J. Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
H.L.A. HART 210, 211, 218 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977). The distinction between normativized
and non-normativized conceptions of promising is a generalization of the distinction made by Raz
between the obligation conception and the intention conception thereof. Moreover, the normativized
conception corresponds, at least roughly, to what Pratt calls "the volitional account," and has very close
affinities with Owens's authority interest account of promising (as opposed to the information interest
account). See Michael Gordon Pratt, Promising and Promissory Obligation 81-116 (June 2004) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney) (on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review); David Owens, A
Simple Theory of Promising, 115 PHIL. REv. (forthcoming Jan. 2006). For other generally insightful
discussions of promising, see Randy E. Barnett, Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract, in
LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN LAW AND MORALS 135 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris
eds., 1991); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981);
Eric Mack, Natural and Contractual Rights, 87 ETHICS 153 (1977); and T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE
TO EACH OTHER 295-327 (1998).
6. Gary Watson, Promising, Assurance, and Expectation 15 (April 2004) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/kadish/gala/
Promising,%20%20assurance%20and%20expectation.pdf.
7. JUDITH JARvIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 302-03 (1990). It should be noted that Thom-
son here uses the notion of an invitation to rely in a normativized sense of offering to impose an obliga-
tion.
2006]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
by the promisee. The legalized version is of interest if the purpose is to give
an account of legally binding contracts (understood as exchanges of prom-
ises). Here, however, I am concerned with the moral obligation to keep
promises, and hence I shall focus on the moralized version. 8
On the moralized conception, there is no mystery about how promis-
ing generates a moral obligation to the promisee. It is simply part of the
meaning of "promising" so understood that it generates such an obligation.
It is, however, an open question whether anyone has ever made a promise!
The answer depends on whether anyone ever placed herself under an obli-
gation in the specified manner. Promising, on this conception, requires that
a valid offer be made, and this requires that (1) one is at moral liberty with
respect to the promisee to perform the promised act; (2) one has the moral
power-by giving valid consent-to relinquish that liberty and give an-
other a claim-right against one that one perform that act; (3) one gives con-
sent; and (4) the conditions under which the consent is given (e.g., freely
and informedly) make the consent valid.
Moreover, promising requires that the offer be validly accepted, and
this requires that (5) one has the moral power to acquire a claim-right
against the promisor that she perform that act by giving valid consent to a
valid offer; (6) one gives consent; and (7) the conditions under which the
consent is given (e.g., freely and informedly) were valid.
If any of these conditions fail, then a moralized promise has not been
made, and no obligation has been generated. If individuals do not have the
right kinds of rights (the liberties and powers above) or do not exercise
them under the right conditions, then there are no promises; there are only
purported promises. 9
The moralized conception of promising is very different from the
common sense notion. Still, it is a legitimate notion, and it is perfectly ac-
ceptable to ask whether promising so understood generates an obligation to
the promisee. The answer, we have seen, is that by definition it does.
8. Note that promissory obligations can be acquired unintentionally (as well as intentionally) on
the normativized view. Suppose, for example, that Harris falsely believes that Jones is dead. Harris says
to Smith, "I promise to go to the theater if Jones asks me," and Smith accepts the offer. If Jones shows
up and asks Harris to go, then Harris has an obligation to go. (On the non-normativized view, promis-
sory obligations are typically undertaken unintentionally, but they can be undertaken intentionally, as
when I promise you I will stop smoking with the intention of acquiring an obligation to you so as to
provide additional motivation for stopping.).
9. There is a broader normativized conception than the one I have defined here. It holds that a
promise is made when an offer (whether or not valid) is made to undertake an obligation and is ac-
cepted (whether or not validly) by the promisee. It thus allows that at least sometimes promises do not
generate obligations (e.g., when the promisor does not have the relevant authority to undertake the
obligation). I am indebted to Les Green for identifying this version of the normativized conception. I
focus on the narrow version for simplicity.
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I believe that individuals have certain natural rights, and that these in-
clude the rights of full self-ownership and the powers to acquire rights over
others by consensual transfer. If this is so, then there often are moralized
promisings, and these generate obligations to the promisee. Full self-
ownership is simply a special case of full private ownership. Full private
ownership of an object consists roughly of a full set of the following own-
ership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the object-both the liberty-
right to use and the security-right against others using without one's per-
mission; (2) rights to compensation if someone uses the object without
one's permission; (3) enforcement rights (to prevent the violation of these
rights or to extract compensation owed for past violation); (4) rights to
transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan); and (5) immu-
nity to the non-consensual loss of any of the rights of ownership.10 For the
present purposes, the (control) security-rights, the rights to compensation,
and the enforcement rights can be ignored. What matters for the promising
issue is that an agent have (1) the (control) liberty-right to perform the
promised action; (2) the right (power) to transfer that right to someone else
(thereby losing the liberty-right not to perform it and giving the other per-
son a claim-right to its performance); and (3) a reasonably robust immunity
to the non-consensual loss of these rights (so that agents typically have the
previous two rights if they have not consensually transferred them away).
Obviously, even this weak form of self-ownership would be contro-
versial if it was advocated as an all-things-considered view (which I would
advocate). Here, however, I am only concerned with pro tanto moral obli-
gations, and hence we only need these self-ownership rights to be pro tanto
rights. Of course, some might object to them even in the pro tanto form,
but most, I think, would accept them in this form. In any case, I shall not
attempt here to defend the view. The important point is that if full self-
ownership and the power to acquire rights by transfers are granted, and one
assumes (as seems plausible) that the rights of transfer are often exercised
under valid conditions (e.g., freely and informedly), it follows that moral-
ized promises are often made. From that, it follows immediately that indi-
viduals often acquire moral obligations to perform their promised acts.
10. For further discussion of full ownership in general and of full self-ownership in particu-
lar, see Peter Vallentyne, Self-Ownership, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1561 (Lawrence C.
Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 2d ed. 2001); Peter Vallentyne, Libertarianism, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2002),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112002/entries/libertarianism/; Peter Vallentyne et al., Why Left-
Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
201 (2005).
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In short, if full self-ownership is granted, then it is clear that individu-
als typically owe an obligation to their promisees to keep their moralized
promises. Next, I will consider the non-normativized conception of promis-
ing, which is, I believe, much closer to the common sense view.
II. THE NON-NORMATIVIZED CONCEPTION OF PROMISING
On the non-normativized conception of promising, the fact that a
promise was made does not conceptually entail anything about obligations
of any sort, and nothing about moral obligations in particular. There may
be a valid moral principle that entails that promisors sometimes, or even
always, have a moral obligation to keep their promises, but any such obli-
gation does not follow from the mere fact that a promise was made. Such
an obligation would require that some related moral principle about prom-
ising be true.
There are many versions of the non-normativized conception, but a
strong version-one that is especially likely to generate an obligation-
might hold that A promises B that she will perform some future action if
and only if (1) A asserts that she will do so; (2) she thereby expresses a
finn intention to do so; (3) she assures B that she will do so; (4) she invites
B to rely on this assurance; (5) B accepts this invitation; and (6) the above
is common knowledge between the two parties. Perhaps not all of these
elements are essential, and perhaps there are some additional necessary
conditions, but the general idea should be clear. Promising in this sense
leaves open as a conceptual matter whether the promisor has an obligation
(of any sort) to the promisee to do as promised.
The following are two examples of non-normativized conceptions:
According to the first [intention conception of promises], promises are
expressions of firm intentions to act.11
[P]romising as a speech act will here be explained as an utterance of the
speaker's about his own future conduct which is essentially characterized
by the speaker's intending his addressee to take it as being intended to
induce the addressee to rely upon the speaker's taking the action in ques-
tion. 12
11. Raz, supra note 5, at 211. Raz rejects this conception.
12. Neil MacCormick, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers: Part 1, 46 ARISTOTELIAN
SOC'Y, SUPP. VOL. 59, 62 (1972).
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On the non-normativized conception, then, the fact that an action
breaks a promise may provide a moral reason not to perform that action,
but it is not part of the concept of promising that there is some moral reason
to keep the promise. On the moralized conception, on the other hand, to say
that an action breaks a promise is simply to assert that there is a moral rea-
son owed to the promisee not to perform that promise-breaking action.
On any reasonable non-normativized conception of promising, prom-
ising often takes place. All that is necessary is (roughly) that the appropri-
ate assertion, assurance, and invitation be made and that the invitation to
rely upon the assurance be taken up. The question then arises as to whether
there is a (pro tanto) moral obligation to the promisee to perform the prom-
ised action. That is, do individuals have a (pro tanto) moral right against
promisors to have non-normativized promises made to them kept? Differ-
ent moral theories give different answers. Act utilitarianism, for example,
denies that there are rights at all and thus holds that there is no such right
(although this theory will, of course, be indirectly sensitive to the impor-
tance of keeping promises). 13 Social practice views can hold that one has a
right to have promises kept if one participates in the right kind of way in
the right kind of social practice of promising.' 4 Instrumental rule-based
theories of morality, such as rule consequentialism 15 and rule contractual-
ism, 16 can, and probably do, recognize a right to have promises kept. Our
focus, however, is on natural rights. Is there a natural right to have non-
normativized promises made to one kept?
One possibility is that the natural rights of self-ownership somehow
include the right to have non-normativized promises made to one kept.
Self-ownership includes security-rights that make it impermissible for oth-
ers to physically use one's person (touching, striking, etc.) without one's
permission. Perhaps these security-rights also make it impermissible for
others to mentally use one's person in certain ways without one's permis-
sion. After all, the person that one owns (oneself) is not merely a physical
thing. It is also a mental thing. Ownership of a physically embodied mental
thing arguably gives one some rights over it that one would not have if the
thing were merely a physical thing. Perhaps there are certain ways of
"messing with a person's mind" that are incompatible with her security
ownership rights over her mind. Perhaps subliminal hypnosis, certain kinds
of deception, certain kinds of emotional harms, and threats to wrongfully
13. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR & AGAINST (1973).
14. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note I at 342-50; Searle, supra note 1.
15. See, e.g,, HOOKER, supra note 3 at 122-23, 131-32.
16. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note I at 27-33; Searle, supra note 1; GAUTHIER, supra note 2.
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harm are such ways of messing with a person's mind. If so, then perhaps
breaking a non-normativized promise is also incompatible with a person's
security ownership rights.
In the abstract, I find this possibility plausible. I have, however, been
unable to come up with a general account of "mental use" (or "messing
with a person's mind") that would plausibly be precluded by ownership
rights over a mental being. It cannot simply involve having one's mind
altered; almost everything others do does that. When you walk by me in a
public park, your action typically alters my beliefs about the world. Any
mental use that self-ownership precludes must be restricted to actions that
alter one's mental state in ways that undermine or bypass one's mental
capacities, or something like that. It is not clear, however, what a general
account of mental use would look like.
Even if self-ownership does not entail a right to have non-
normativized promises kept, there may still be a natural right to have them
kept. Agents have more rights than just self-ownership rights (e.g., rights to
acquire property rights in other things). It may be that agents have certain
communication rights against other communicators simply by virtue of
their both being communicators. In what follows, I shall briefly explore this
possibility, leaving open whether this follows from full self-ownership or
not.
As indicated above, merely having one's beliefs altered by another (as
when you walk past me) does not violate one's self-ownership or any other
natural right that one has. Nor does having one's beliefs damaged (i.e.,
altered in an undesirable way). You violate no right of mine when you walk
past me wearing a tuxedo and I form the false belief that you are going to a
wedding. Nor, I think, are any rights violated when one's beliefs are dam-
aged by the assertions of others. You violate no right of mine when you
falsely assert to me that Smith is going to a wedding and I believe you.
Asserting would be far too risky if there were such a right. Things may,
however, be different, if we limit our attention to those assertions that are
accompanied by a special guarantee-giving one's word. If the assertor
explicitly says, "You have my word," "I warrant it to be true," or "I swear
that it is true," then it. is not so clearly unreasonable to hold her accountable
for the truth of her assertion when someone takes her at her word (i.e.,
treats the special guarantee as having the right kind of significance). Such
accountability imposes no unreasonable liability on assertors because they
need not give their word and because effective communication would seem
to require that those who give their word be accountable for the truth of
their assertions.
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There is, of course, the important question of what it is to give one's
word. Just as there is a distinction between normativized and non-
normativized promising, there is a distinction between normativized and
non-normativized word-giving. To give one's word in the moralized (nor-
mativized) sense is something like a word-giver's valid acceptance of a
valid offer to undertake certain obligations to the word-receiver should a
specified proposition be false. Here, however, I am concerned with the
non-moralized sense.
What is it to give one's word in a non-moralized sense? Obviously,
there are many different accounts. The crucial feature, however, is that
some kind of special assurance is given for the truth of the assertion. It is
something like assertion under heightened standards for assertion. The
word-giver is expressing her confidence in the truth of the proposition, not
merely for everyday contexts of assertion, but also for contexts in which
the truth of the proposition is especially important. Moreover, she is not
merely expressing her heightened confidence; she is also in some sense
inviting the other to rely upon it. Much more needs to be said on this topic,
but I shall not explore this further here.
It seems plausible that agents have certain communication rights
against those who give them their word. (Indeed, something like this may
follow from a proper understanding of the mental aspects of full self-
ownership.) One can give one's word for any proposition (e.g., that it
rained in Hong Kong yesterday). Promising, on a particularly important
non-normativized conception, is simply the act of giving one's word that
one will perform some future action. 17 Rights against promisors, on this
conception, are simply special cases of rights against word-givers.
Much more careful discussion is needed of whether individuals really
do have rights against word-givers. Here, I simply assume that this is so
and explore the content of such rights. Suppose that I give you my word
that my car is in my garage. What rights do you have against me? It seems
plausible that you have a right that, if the asserted proposition is false: (1) I
alert you as soon as I discover the word-given proposition is not true; (2) I
apologize to you for my mistake; and (3) I compensate you for relevant
damages. 18 The important point is that, in general, word-receivers do not
seem to have a right against word-givers that, if possible, they make the
word-given proposition true. You do not, it seems, have a right against me
17. For more on promising as a special case of word-giving, see THOMSON, supra note 7, at 294-
321. It should be noted, however, that Thomson probably invokes word-giving in the moralized sense.
18. 1 leave open whether the relevant damages are limited to reliance damages (i.e., losses from
choices made that relied on the truth of the word-given proposition) or whether there may also be some
kind of "emotional damages" for the discomfort of having one's mind messed with.
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that I place my car in my garage merely because I gave my word that it was
there, even though you may well have the above three rights. If, as I am
supposing, promises are simply special cases of word-giving, then it would
also seem that promisees do not generate rights against promisors that they
perform the promised actions. Promisees may well have (1) a right to be
alerted, if the promisor realizes that he will not perform the promised ac-
tion; (2) a right to an apology; and (3) a right to compensation; but, on this
(non-normativized) conception of promising, promisees arguably do not
have a right to have the promised action performed.
Obviously, the issue is complex and requires much more discussion.
The above account is meant to be merely suggestive of what a plausible
non-normativized account of promising might look like. The speculation is
that there is no natural right to have non-normativized promises kept, if
promising is simply a special case of word-giving. Clearly, there are other
possible non-normativized accounts, and I have not ruled out the possibility
that there is a natural right to have promises kept on some such account.
CONCLUSION
Because I believe that agents have (1) the requisite liberty-rights of ac-
tion and power-rights to renounce such liberty-rights and give someone
else a claim-right against that action, and (2) the requisite powers to acquire
claim-rights over others by consensual transfer, I believe that agents can
and do make moralized promises. Keeping such promises is morally
obligatory by definition. Most of what people want to accomplish from
promising can be accomplished by moralized promising.
Still, it is an interesting question as to whether individuals also have
the right to have non-normativized promises kept, even when they do not
correspond to any normativized promise. The idea that agents have certain
rights against those who give them their word that certain propositions are
true seems quite plausible (and may well follow from full self-
ownershipl9). A particularly attractive and relevant non-normativized ac-
count of promising takes promising simply to be giving one's word con-
19. The following is an imperfect analogy that may be suggestive of how self-ownership might
generate rights against word-givers: If you are permitted, but not obligated, to improve the stairs in my
house (improve my beliefs), and you come in and damage my stairs (give your word to a false belief),
then I have a right against you that you alert me, apologize to me, and compensate me, or perhaps
restore the stairs to their original condition. I do not have a right that you improve the stairs. Similarly,
if you come in and begin the work of improving the stairs (give me your word that you will do some-
thing), and then fail to complete the project (fail to keep your word), and this damages the stairs, then,
once again, I have the above rights against you, but not the right that you improve the stairs (do as
promised).
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cerning one's future conduct. In general, giving one's word to a proposition
does not, it seems, give the word-receiver a right that, if possible, the word-
giver make the proposition true. Promising as a special case of word-giving
thus seems to generate certain rights, but not the right to have the promised
action performed. If this is right (and greater analysis is needed), then this
is an important difference between moralized promising and this particu-
larly attractive non-normative conception of promising.20
20. For helpful comments, I thank Larry Alexander, Trent Dougherty, Heidi Hurd, Eduardo
Rivera-L6pez, Eric Mack, Mike Otsuka, David Owens, Erik Roark, Seana Shiffin, Michael Pratt, Hillel
Steiner, and Catherine Valcke. I have also benefited from discussion with the participants at the Round-
table on The Moral Bindingness of Promises, Program in Law and Philosophy, University of Illinois at
Urbana/Champaign (2005) and the participants at the Workshop on Economic, Ethics, and the Law
(Commitment and Contract), XXII World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy,
Granada, Spain (2005).
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